The main purpose of this paper is to formalise the modelling process, analysis and mathematical definition of corruption when entering into a contract between principal agent and producers. The formulation of the problem and the definition of concepts for the general case are considered. For definiteness, all calculations and formulas are given for the case of three producers, one principal agent and one intermediary. Economic analysis of corruption allowed building a mathematical model of interaction between agents. Financial resources distribution problem in a contract with a corrupted intermediary is considered. Then proposed conditions for corruption emergence and its possible consequences. Optimal non-corruption schemes of financial resources distribution in a contract are formed, when principal agent`s choice is limited first only by asymmetrical information and then also by external influences. Numerical examples suggesting optimal corruption-free agents' behaviour are presented.
Introduction
Nowadays problem of corruption gets a lot of attention in both scientific and political spheres. The reason for such interest is due to harmful effects it has on society and economy. Corruption undermines the functioning of the host state and lowers the efficiency of production (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). It also hampers economic development and growth, especially since it has negative impact on investment rates (Wei and Wu, 2001) . Corruption is most commonly defined as the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank, 1997) . Recent studies are focusing more and more on specific anti-corruption programmes based on countries' experiences. A numerous research is coming from developing countries describing current economy situation and proposing anti-corruption measures.
The president of Russian Federation has set a very important task for Russia to enter into the top twenty countries in the «Ease of doing business» ranking provided by the World Bank. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. Empirical research funded by the World Bank to justify their work shows that the effect of improving these regulations on economic growth is strong (World Bank, 2013) .
National anti-corruption committee ran by Kirill Kabanov is conducting a research for
Kremlin on corruption strategies used in Russia and other countries. As a result of this analysis, the head of the National anti-corruption committee will propose to include additional legal mechanism for fighting against corruption. National Anti-Corruption Strategy was introduced in Russia in 2010, but there are some questions raised about its efficiency. Due to the fact that currently in Russia there is no thorough analysis of corruption practices and no thorough analysis of anti-corruption mechanisms, running anti-corruption plan does not prove to be effective.
The purpose of the conducted research, the results of which are presented in this paper, is to formalise the modelling process, analysis and mathematical definition of corruption when entering into a contract and to find optimal strategies for a corruption-free interaction between principal agent and producers. The principal agent 0 F can contact an intermediary F in order to get information about the change in the level of production  .
Mathematical model of corruption-free interaction between principal agent and producers
In case there is an increase in production level f  , the producer can spend less money than the amount of funds provided by the principal agent 0 F , and thus gain additional profit. The producer i F wants to conceal this information, and hence he/she offers a bribe i z to the intermediary F . In this model we consider a case of a corrupted intermediary. If there is a decrease in the production level d  , then the provided funds are not enough to sustain production level, and hence the producer wants the official report to contain true information, and thus, he/she is required to offer bribe i z to the intermediary F , as the intermediary threatens to hide this information. If the intermediary F is not aware of the above, he/she does not tend to conceal any information. In order to stop intermediary F and the producer i F from negotiating between themselves, the principal agent 0 F can make a legal payment S to the intemediary F . In this case the intermediary presents true information in the report R . Then the principal agent makes a decision about funds distribution 
Formalisation of the corruption model  when entering into a contract
Consider a model with three producers. 
-is the change in the level of production, which is a private information held by the producers. The payoff of the producers is defined by the formula: 1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  1  2  3   =  (  )  ,  =  (  )  ,  = 
In case the intermediary F finds out the true situation about the production level, he/she can eaither specify this information in the report for the principal agent, or conceal it. The report sent to the principal agent 0 F by the intermediary F is denoted as 1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3   1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3   2  3  2  3  2  3  2  3   1  3  1  3  1  3   {( , , ) , ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), 13   1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2   2  2  1  1   33 , , ),
The probabilities , = 1, 2,3 i pi of the change in the production level being positive, together with probabilities i  of the intermediary F learning the information, define 32 states. The payoff function of the principal agent is defined as follows:
where Q -is the amount of produced goods, T -are funds given to the producers 2.2 The construction of optimal funds distribution schemes with no corruption when entering into a contract.
The problem of funds distribution when entering into a contract under conditions of information asymmetry with no intermediary
Four states exist for each producer 13 16 :{ = ( , , ), = ( , , )},
where
The remaining states (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) have the probability of 0. The producers (but not the principal agent) observe the true change in the level of production before taking a decision on the efforts needed. By using (1), (2) and (4) the function of the principal agent can be written as 
The delivery contract between the principal agent and producers is defined by the set (9) are required to make sure that the producers choose the contract designed for the real production level  . Finally, the following inequality should be satisfied
, which excludes the possibility of the producers going bankrupt. The principal agent solves the following problem 
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Moreover,
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The function ) (
defines a bonus, which should be offered in case production plan is achieved.
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Based on the assumption above, ,,
The production plan under favourable conditions is at the optimal level with complete information, whereas it is disrupted under unfavourable conditions (it does not reach the required production level) 4 
ee . Now define functions useful for further analysis. 
The first option of the best result is expressed as:
Similarly, the second option of the best result is defined (for 
Financial resources distribution problem in a contract with a corrupted intermediary
This section describes how a principal agent with asymmetrical information can increase his/her payoff by utilising information given by a more informed intermediary.
Consider two scenarios: 1st scenario is a general case, in which a choice of principal agent`s resources optimal distribution is limited by only asymmetrical information; 2nd scenario is a case, in which principal agent`s choice can also be affected by limitations coming from external influence.
Assume that principal agent does not want the producer to go bankrupt, when the producer is facing a decrease in productivity. For example, even though the producer can overcome such a decrease, this can lead to the closure of factories or companies. In many countries there is a government support for the manufacturers in place. The limitations coming from external influence are represented as limitations of possible losses for the producer, i.e. he/she should not incur losses in scenarios 1 and 2. This means that one can only avoid going bankrupt when the principal agent is informed about the change in the productivity level. ii FF HH  , then there exists a risk of blackmail, i.e. the intermediary might demand the bribe for presenting true information in the report. These 2 cases of a possible bribe have two significant differences. First difference is that the net profit for a coalition in the case of blackmail is negative, whereas the net profit in the case of offering a bribe from the producer, is positive. Second difference is that in the case of blackmail 7 there is no influence on the report of the intermediary for the principal agent. This affects the revenue of the principal agent, because firstly, demanding the bribe reduces the potential profit of the producer and thus, it influences the individual limitation of the producer. Secondly, it creates a difference between the contractual and realised utility which can lead to non-fulfilment of the boundary condition 0  
Conditions for corruption emergence and its possible consequences

F is limited by only asymmetrical information, then there is no blackmail.
It is obvious that there is no offer of the bribe from the producer to the intermediary in the equilibrium state. This situation exists, because it is cheaper for the principal agent 0 F to make a legal payment S to the intermediary F (positive operational costs), rather than give up the information to the producers (or coalition). This also explains why a stimulating method of fighting against corruption always dominates. The result of the blackmail absence is less obvious: it appears that the optimal reaction to the bribe given by the producer to the intermediary excludes only a part of blackmail. In this paper we would only derive the results shown in Proposition 1.
With Lemma 1 it is known that the principal agent`s payment S , which prevents the producer from offering the bribe, should be at least equal to the amount of money which the producer could have offered to the intermediary with deduction of transaction costs. As the profits for the producer lead to the costs for the principal agent, we can write the following boundary condition in the form of equality, which prevents the producer from offering the bribe: 1  1  1  2  2  2  3  3  3  1 1  2 2  3 3  , ,  , 
In this case the optimal planned production volume is not achieved in the state 4, i.e. 
and
The payment 1 i s -is a function of difference between producer`s payoffs in the states 3 and 1. In the point of optimality the principal agent offers a contract, in which the losses are shared between different states in a way that the difference 31 
()
ii FF HH  is minimal, and at the same time the expected payoffs of the producers are minimal. To achieve this it is required that, independent of the intentions of the producers, the payoff in the unfavourable situation, does not depend on the
Hence the optimal answer, which would prevent the producer from offering the bribe, excludes the risk of blackmail. The reason for this is the fact that the obligations of the producer are not really limited, and we would have an inequality
. This means that the threat of offering the bribe by the producer, forces the principal agent to make a positive payment, even when he/she is informed. On the other hand, if the limitations are not enough to keep the producer at his level of productivity with positive profits in the state 1, then the optimal contract would lead to a negative value 1 i F H . The optimal contract without corruption can be described by the set of 3 elements dependent on the report ( , 
In case when information asymmetry is the only limitation when making a contract, one needs to always contact the intermediary, because the principal agent can always ignore the report when making a decision. In case when there are expenses needed to cover any side payments ( >0  ), the contract made on the basis of the intermediary`s report strictly dominates the direct contract.
The formation of optimal non-corruption schemes of financial resources distribution in a contract, when principal agent`s choice is limited by asymmetrical information and external influences
Consider a scenario when in addition to information asymmetry there are also external
influencing the principal agent's choice. In this situation blackmail becomes a serious problem.
In this case, in contrary to the results obtained from Lemma1, the optimal reaction to the blackmail is sensitive to the assumptions of the bargain procedures. The reason for this is the fact that legal transfer of finances to the intermediary is not a separate process. In contrary, the legal transfer of finances including finances for producers . Whether the legal transfer of money has an effect on the decision of the intermediary, depends on the way the joint payoff is shared amongst the parties.
Let assume that the intermediary makes an <<accept or reject>> offer. Then the size of the legal funds transfer, which is required to avoid the blackmail, is determined by the mechanism that forces the intermediary to conceal information in case the producer rejects the offer. The situation when the intermediary has a full bargaining power, which makes the threat of hiding information highly probable, is outside the scope of this paper.
Let assume on contrary, that the result of the illegal bargain is a joint payoff, related to
, and it is shared between the parties in a way that all parties receive strictly positive sum of money. In this case, the funds transfer required to avoid the blackmail, is a function of sum of money of the intermediary.
Consider a situation where the bargain procedures can be described as an alternative offer game with a risk of failure. The <<failure>> is equivalent to the contract dependent on = i r  . One of the possible interpretations is the one where the principal agent can unilaterally decide not to wait for the report, whereas intermediary and brokers are not aware of what drives the principal agent`s decision.
Analysing similar results from bargaining games, we see that the solution is the one from the Nash's problem of bargaining (how to share common cost). The sum of money, which needs to be shared is , confuses the intermediary and holds him/her from blackmailing the broker, because he/she can not receive a bigger payoff in the bargaining game. In reality it can be shown that, assuming infinitely small bribe (which is not considered in the paper), the principal agent can use the presence of expenses to hide side payments. If the parties have unequal bargaining powers in the game, then the minimal legal funds transfer is enough (almost surely) to avoid the demanding of the bribe, and it is equal to
The scheme, where the principal agent can prevent blackmail by means of legal funds transfer (proportional to the profits of the brokers) to the intermediary, may not be optimal, contrary to the case, when the producer is offering the bribe himself/herself.
The optimal mechanism is characterised by the following principals. It is obvious, that the absence of bribe from the producer is analogous to the already considered case without limitations. Whereas, the result that there is <<almost no>> blackmail is an effect coming from the external limitation. The external limitation means that the payoff of the producer in the state 2 must not be negative,
. If the producer pays the demanded bribe in the state 2 , then the contract should compensate him/her for this loss, i.e.
. Given that  is slightly more than zero, it appears that paying compensation to the producer creates higher costs, than the legal funds transfer or exclusion of the blackmail risk. Here <<almost no>> comes from the discontinuity of the intermediary's marginal payoff at the point where there is no demanding of the bribe. The proof of Proposition 2 was given by Lambert-Mogiliansky (1996), and full solution to the problem was also provided. Here we would provide the results for the case considered above, when the bargain's procedure is «an alternative offer with a risk of failure». The planning program is described as follows
[ ( 
It follows that 44 
As the power of the producer  in the bargaining problem tends to 0, the right side of the expression becomes infinitely large. It means that the method of encouragement becomes very wasteful, that is why the principal agent uses a different method. Hence, it is not always optimal for the principal agent to prevent blackmail through encouragements, contrary to the case when the producer is offering the bribe. The most favourable method really depends on how big the sum of money the intermediary can get is. The bigger the sum the intermediary can get, the more expensive the method of encouragements is. The boundary (in terms of relative powers in the bargaining problem), on which the optimal solution switches from the method of encouragements to the method of exclusion (i.e.  is so that (29) is true with equality sign), is a function of model 12 parameters  . The optimal contract (on condition that (29) is satisficed) becomes: 
In case when there is a corrupted intermediary in the bargain, and the contract should be satisfying external boundary conditions, then the dominance of the contract dependent on the report over a direct scheme, is not guaranteed. However, it is quite hard to deduct a sufficient condition of dominance with a general form function. Below we consider a numerical example (see Example2), in which a contract depending on the report is dominant (following some parameter specifications), if producer and intermediary have same bargaining powers in the bargaining problem. If the intermediary's bargaining power in the problem of bargaining is so high, that the principal agent prefers to exclude the threat of blackmail, then the usage of a corrupted intermediary is strictly dominated.
Example 1.
The following parameters are defined: Consider a situation when planning of funds distribution is under the influence of external limitations.
First we find an optimal change in the production plan under unfavourable market conditions. As expected, the contract drawn up for the unfavourable market conditions in case of information asymmetry, is inevitably more skewed.
Calculate the values of the necessary legal funds transfers needed to prevent the contract from corruption. HH  Based on the derived results, it is more favourable for the principal agent to make a contract with the third producer and the intermediary, and to also make legal fund transfers, which will exclude the corruption. But if the principal agent is forced to deal with all three producers (to avoid bankruptcy of either of them), then the principal agent gives the smallest possible sum of money to the producer with the lower expected payoff Example 2.
Assume that the principal agent chooses to exclude the possibility of blackmail (in situation when the bargaining power of the intermediary is significantly bigger than the one of the producer). For example, the intermediary makes an offer <<take-it-or-leave-it>>. Let us consider example based on only one producer (taking parameters from Example 1).
First we need to find an optimal change in the production plan under unfavourable market conditions 1 4 e , which is same as in 
HH
In this situation, the principal agent should not use the intermediary.
Conclusion
The president of Russian Federation has set a very important task for Russia to enter into the top twenty countries in the «Doing business» ranking provided by the World Bank by 2018. As currently analysis of corruption practices and methods of anti-corruption activities are not well documented, all government proposed solutions did not prove to be effective. The paper presents formalisation of modelling process, analysis and mathematical description of corruption problem when entering into a contract between principal agent and producers.
It is suggested to carry out further research focusing on building real models for specific projects.
